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Classical Advaitic Definitions of ‘Substance’ and the Unreality of the World 
 
Many recent studies have highlighted the dialectical structure of the argumentative strategies 
through which Brahmanical and Buddhist conceptual systems developed in classical India. 
The diverse groups of Vedāntic thinkers were engaged in mutual doctrinal controversy over 
the nature of Brahman, and sought alternately to appropriate or to dismantle the standpoints 
of their Buddhist interlocutors. For instance, while medieval Advaita Vedānta often 
positioned itself as sharply antagonistic to Buddhism, Śaṁkara (c.c.800 CE) himself had, 
however, arguably Vedānticized certain Buddhist elements that were transmitted to him 
through his spiritual lineage. Further, there are striking parallels between the deconstruction 
of rival Buddhist standpoints attempted by Nāgārjuna (c.c.200 CE) who tried to demonstrate 
the deep incoherence of any substantialist vocabulary, and the Advaitin project, roughly ten 
centuries later, of Śrī Harṣa who trained his dialectical weapons at the realist categories of the 
Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika. If a standard accusation against Vedāntic figures such as Śaṁkara was that 
they had ‘gone Buddhist’, some Buddhist figures themselves would seem, at least in the 
representation of their rivals, to have moved towards Vedāntic conceptualisations of the self 
as substantival. Thus, strands of Mahāyāna Buddhism such as the Yogāacāra and the 
Tathāgatagarbha were sometimes accused by other Buddhist camps of ‘substantializing’ the 
ultimate when they spoke respectively of a ‘storehouse-consciousness’ underlying empirical 
cognitions or a ‘Buddha-nature’ in all sentient beings.     
 
This overview of some of the overlaps as well as disjunctions between the two camps in 
Vedāntic–Buddhist dialectics already indicates that a central theme that structured these 
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arguments was the notion of ‘substance’. We shall argue that while certain forms of Vedānta 
and Madhyamaka Buddhism are shaped by the same set of presuppositions regarding 
‘substance’, they derive opposed conclusions from this point of departure as they elaborate 
their conceptual universes. Further, while  both Advaitins such as Śaṁkaraa and 
Viśiṣṭādvaitins such as Rāmānuja a seek to defend against their Buddhist rivals the thesis that 
the phenomenal world is a ‘dependent substance’, in the sense that it derives its empirical 
being from the foundational Ground of Brahman, they disagree over this crucial question: 
‘precisely how real is this dependent substance?’ As we will note, while Viśiṣṭādvaitins such 
as Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika argue that the phenomenal world is a substantivally real 
entity that is ontologically dependent on the Lord Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, several key Advaitins 
reject this standpoint on the ground that the notion of ‘dependent substance’ is logically 
incoherent. The ‘Advaita’ standpoint itself, however, is more fine-grained that this 
oppositional sketch would indicate: we shall argue that the Advaitins we discuss in this essay 
can be placed on a conceptual spectrum ranging from the affirmation that the world has some 
‘measure’ of phenomenal reality (what we shall call the Weak Advaita of, for instance, the 
fourteenth century Advaitin Prakāśātman) to the denial that the world possesses any ‘degree’ 
of phenomenal substantiality whatsoever (whatwhat we shall call the Strong Advaita of, for 
instance, the seventeenth century Advaitin Prakāśānanda).  While many of the disputes in 
Vedāantic discourse were conducted on the field of scriptural exegesis, we seek to highlight 
the point that they are often also structured by a key conceptual debate over whether the 
empirical world has any ‘substantial’ reality.  
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The Notion of ‘Substance’ in Advaita  
 
The responses of classical Advaita to this question are structured by the understanding that, 
strictly speaking, Reality (sat) is that which is not subject to any transformations, or, to use a 
characteristic Advaitic turn of phrase, that which is not sublated through the three times 
(Ramachandran 1969:5). Śaṁkara argues, in his commentary on Taittirīya Upaniṣad II, 1, 1 
(p.291), that something is said to be substantivally real (satya) when once it has been 
ascertained to be in a certain condition it does not undergo any change in that condition 
(yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṁ tadrūpaṁ na vyabhicarati). Therefore, all empirical entities that 
form the spatio-temporal world are said to be substantivally unreal because they undergo 
change (vikāra). (Swami Gambhirananda 1972: 291). A clear substantival distinction is 
therefore to be drawn between empirical states of consciousness such as dreams and waking 
experiences and the Self, because unlike the Self which is self-existent they are transient 
events. These states cannot truly belong to the Self, for what is one’s own nature is never 
seen to cease to persist while one is persisting (na hi yasya yatsvarūpam tat tadvyabhicāri 
dṛṣṭam) (Upadeśasāhasrī I, 2, 89, : Swami Jagadananda 1979: p.54)).1 This axiomatic 
equivalence between Reality and immutability forms the conceptual basis for Advaita’s 
attempts to demonstrate, by appeal to epistemic instruments (pramāṇas) such as perception, 
inference, and scriptural revelation, that the trans-categoreal reality of Brahman is non-dual 
with the phenomenal world which is an insubstantial illusion. One of the analogies that 
Śaṁkara uses for this Advaitic thesis is that of the substantival clay from which pots are 
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produced. He argues that pots of clay are really clay in their causal substance, for these 
modifications (vikāra) are names only which originate and exist through speech. Therefore, 
to the extent that they are names they are unreal (anṛtaṃ), and to the extent that they are of 
the ‘stuff’ of clay they are real (satyaṃ) (Brahma-sSūtra-bBhāṣya [BSB] II, 1, 14;  Thibaut 
1890, vol.1, pp.: 320–21).2 Śaṁkara employs this analogy, of course, to indicate that 
Brahman is the substantival Ground of the phenomenal world, not in the sense that Brahman 
is like the mundane substances (dravya) that one encounters in everyday life, but that 
Brahman is the eternal, unconditioned, and indivisible hyper-Being that subsists beyond all 
empirical changes. The axiomatic equivalence between Reality (sat) and non-origination 
indicated in this analogy underlies Śaṁkara’s view that the Self, one’s true nature, is never 
destroyed because it is uncaused; therefore, liberation is neither a union nor a separation from 
the Self, for these processes are transitory (Upadeśasāhasrī II, 16, 39–41, ; Swami 
Jagadananda 1979: p. 179).
3
 Consequently, agency does not belong to the very nature of the 
self (na svābhāvikaṃ kartṛtvamātmanaḥ saṁbhavati), for there would then be no liberation 
from it, just as fire cannot be separated from heat (BSB II, 3, 40;; Thibaut 1890: vol.2, 
p.53).Swami Gambhirananda 1977: 498).
4
   
 
The basic theme that reality, strictly speaking, has an unchanging intrinsic nature had already 
been articulated by Śaṁkara’s paramaguru Gauḍapāda who utilised distinctive Mahāyāna 
Buddhist terms, images, and allusions to develop a Vedānticised doctrine of non-origination 
(ajātivāda) of the empirical world. The Gauḍapādīya-kārikā employs at several places the 
equivalence between true substantival reality and immutability when it states that the change 
of the immutable Brahman into a world of diversity is only apparent, for if it underwent a 
change in reality (tattvataḥ), the immortal would become mortal (Gauḍapādīya-kārikā [GK] 
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3.19; p. 24).Karmarkar 1953: 24).
5
 Even more clearly, the text defines intrinsic nature 
(prakṛrti) as that which is self-existent, inherent, natural, not artificial, and that which does 
not abandon its own nature (GK 4.9; p.33). Karmarkar 1953: 33).
6
 More concretely, the 
analytic definitions that structure the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā can be stated in this manner: 
 
Reality = Df that which is not subject to any modification. 
Premise 1: If x undergoes change, then x is not Reality.  
Premise 2:  The empirical world undergoes change. 
Conclusion 1: Therefore, the empirical world is not Reality. 
Premise 3: Whatever is not Reality is substantivally non-existent. 
Conclusion 2:  The empirical world is substantivally non-existent. 
 
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that, transcendentally speaking (paramārthatā) there is no 
destruction or origination, nobody is bound to the world and nobody strives for liberation, 
and neither is there anyone who is an aspirant after liberation or anyone who is liberated (GK 
2.32; p.17).Karmarkar 1953: 17).
7
 The argument for the non-origination of substantival 
reality is spelled out through a series of dilemmas regarding the nature of (empirical) 
causality. On the one hand, the causal substance, if it were to undergo an intrinsic change 
when the effect is produced, cannot be eternal (nityam). On the other hand, if we were to 
assume that it is from an unoriginated causal substance that the effect is originated, we have 
no illustration to support such a possibility (dṛṣṭāntastasya nāsti) (GK 4.10–13; 
p.34).Karmarkar 1953: 34).
8
 Further, if both the cause and the effect were to be regarded as 
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originated entities, we would have to determine which one of these should be called the 
‘cause’ and which the ‘effect’. Since both these are ‘unsubstantiated’ (aprasiddha) one 
cannot be the causal basis of the other (GK 4: 14–18; pp.35–6).  Karmarkar 1953: 35–6).9 
The text elaborates these dilemmas to grapple with the question ‘precisely what undergoes 
transformation in everyday changes?’ If the what refers to an existent which possesses 
intrinsic nature, it cannot be originated, and if the what refers to a non-existent, neither can it 
be originated. The conclusion that origination or dissolution are only empirically perceived, 
but are not a feature of Reality, is elaborated by Śaṁkara in his commentary on the 
Gauḍapādīya-kārikā with his own set of dilemmas. Śaṁkara argues  (at 4.22) that if a thing 
already exists (in the strict sense of possessing intrinsic nature), then just because it exists, we 
cannot speak of it being born out of non-existence; and if a thing does not exist, then by the 
very fact of its non-existence it cannot be born (yady asat tathāpi na jāyate asattvād eva) 
(Gauḍapādīya-kārikā-bhāṣya 4.22; p.342). Swami Gambhirananda 1978: 342).
10
 This is because 
such changes involving the mutation of one’s substantival nature (prakṛteḥ anyathābhāva) 
cannot take place any more than fire can become devoid of heat (3.21; p.295). Swami 
Gambhirananda 1978: 295).
11
 
 
The Paradox of Liberation in Classical Advaita 
 
These analytic equivalences between the existent and the immutable can be seen as part of 
the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā’s response, grounded in the Upaniṣadic theme of ultimate reality 
that undergoes no change, to another version of these dilemmas outlined by Nāgārjuna. If an 
entity possesses an own-nature or intrinsic nature (svabhāva), we cannot say that it has 
changed because an own-nature is by definition unchangeable, while if an entity does not 
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possess an own-nature, we cannot say that it has changed for ‘change’ is understood as the 
transformation of one own-nature to something else (King 1995: 129). While Nāgārjuna and 
the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā both accept Premise 1, they dissolve this dilemma in two distinct 
ways because of their ‘diametrically opposite starting points’: the former starts with the 
doctrine of dependent origination, and the latter with the immutable Brahman (Comans 2000: 
95). Thus the former concludes that there is no substantival own-nature (svabhāva), and 
views this thesis of the insubstantiality (śunyatā) of all the fleeting constituents (dharma) as a 
logical explication of the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence (anitya). The Gauḍapādīya-
kārikā concludes, in contrast, that there is a unitary and indivisible intrinsic nature, namely, 
the eternal Brahman, and all worldly changes are insubstantial appearances. For this 
statement of the metaphysical unreality of whatever is not substantival, namely, Premise 3, 
the text invokes the ‘well-established’ (prasiddha) reason that whatever does not exist at the 
beginning and at the end, that is, whatever is a part of the causal nexus, does not exist even in 
the present (ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne’ pi tat tathā) (GK 2.4–6; pp. 10–
11).Karmarkar 1953: 10–11).12 The non-existence of the world indicated in this terse 
aphorism should be read not as the statement that empirical objects are as utterly unreal 
(tuccha) as the proverbial horn of a hare but that because they are causal products they are, 
transcendentally speaking, substantivally unreal through all the three times. 
 
This is the famous doctrine of the two ‘levels’ of truth that Advaita articulates to claim, 
according to John Grimes (1991a: 19), that only Brahman is ‘absolutely real; never being 
subject to contradiction. All else can be called ‘real’ only by courtesy’. The axiomatic status 
of this equivalence between Reality and immutability for Advaita is clear from Śaṁkara’s 
remark, in his commentary on Taittirīya Upaniṣad I, 11, 4 (p. 275),, that what is eternal 
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cannot be produced even if there are a hundred scriptural texts which support this view (na hi 
vacanaśatenāpi nityamārbhyate). (Swami Gambhirananda 1972: 275). However, from the 
human social ‘level’, empirical distinctions, which originate in and are sustained by linguistic 
conventions, are accorded some measure of reality, even if ‘only by courtesy’. We find 
Śaṁkara moving between these two registers when he responds, in his commentary on the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad (p.317), to the argument that if Brahman is the only reality there 
would be no culture of teaching and learning about the unity of Brahman. He replies that if 
the objector means to suggest that when the transcendent Brahman is realised as the only 
reality, there will be no more instruction or learning, this is his position as well. However, if 
the objector claims that instruction is useless even before the realization of Brahman, this 
assertion should be rejected because it contradicts the assumption of aspirants to liberation 
that instruction in Brahman guides them to the final end. (Swami Madhavananda 1950: 317). 
Therefore, while repetition of scriptural texts would be useless for a student who is able to 
cognize the true nature of Brahman on being told just once ‘that you are’, in the case of 
people who are not able to do so, repetition is necessary (BSB IV, 1, 2; Thibaut 1890: vol.2, 
p.334).
13
 From this empirical standpoint, Śaṁkara allows that though it is one and the same 
Self that lies hidden in all reality, we may say, following scripture, that the Self reveals itself 
in a graduated series (uttarottaram) of beings (BSB I, 1, 11; vol.1, p.63).
14
 Therefore, 
injunctions and prohibitions, in both secular and ritual spheres, become meaningful because 
the Self seems to have become different through connection (saṁbandha) with bodies and 
other limiting adjuncts (BSB II, 3, 48; vol.2, p. 67).
15
 Śaṁkara emphasises that such ritual 
actions perform merely the negative role of removing obstacles on the path to the origination 
of knowledge, and in this sense they may be said to subserve final reality mediately 
(ārādupakārakatvāt) (BSB IV, 1, 16; vol.2, p. 359).16 While knowledge, once it has emerged, 
does not need any help towards the accomplishment of its fruit, it does need certain 
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conditions for its origination such as sacrifices, austerities, and so on (āśramakarmāṇi 
vidyayā phalasiddhau na apekṣyante utpattau ca apekṣyante) (BSB III, 4, 26; vol.2, p. 307).17 
From this empirical stance, Śaṁkara even speaks of acts of devotion as leading to different 
results such as gradual emancipation (kramamukti) or worldly success (karmasamṛddhi), for 
these distinct acts are ultimately directed at the highest Self (BSB I, 1, 11; vol.1, p. 62).
18
 
From the transcendental vantage-point, of course, for those who have reached the highest 
state of reality the apparent world does not exist (evam paramārthāvasthāyām 
sarvavyavahārābhavam vadanti vedāntāḥ sarve) (BSB II, 1, 14; vol.1, pp. 329–30).19  
 
Śaṁkara’s fundamental point that Brahman alone is the true reality, for only Brahman is 
utterly incapable of modification, shapes the arguments of his disciple Sureśvara (c. 900 CE) 
for the self-established nature of Brahman at several crucial points. First,  Sureśvara employs 
the equivalence, transcendentally speaking, of substantival reality with immutability (Premise 
1) to argue that the empirical ‘I’ is not the true Self, for the fact that the former is mutable 
shows that it cannot be associated with the eternal Brahman any more than coolness can find 
its way into a blazing fire (Naiṣkarmya-siddhi [NS] 1.38; Alston 1959: p.94).20 Echoing the 
Gauḍapādīya-kārikā, Sureśvara argues in his Saṁbandha-Vārtika (p.34) that the substantial 
nature of things (svabhāva) cannot be changed, and a thing that has lost its nature is void of 
reality (niḥhsvabhāva) like a sky-flower.  (Mahadevan 1972: 34). Therefore, it would be 
mistaken to claim that the mutable ego is a natural (svābhāvika) property of the Self in the 
way that a mango acquires different colours at different times, for the transcendental Self is 
changeless (NS 2.34; p.92).Alston 1959: 92).
21
 Second, since the substantival hyper-Ground, 
the timeless Brahman, is an ever-realised fact, we may speak of ‘attaining’ liberation in terms 
not of the production of a new effect through action but merely of the removal of ignorance 
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
10 
 
(ajñāna-hāna-mātratvāt) (NS 1.24; p.16).22 More specifically, the knowledge which through 
mere manifestation (svarūpa-lābha-mātreṇa) destroys ignorance can be neither a subordinate 
nor a dominant partner with action (NS 1.64; p.44).
23
 Therefore, when ignorance is said to be 
removed through knowledge, Sureśvara indicates in the Saṁbandha-Vārtika (p.17) that the 
perfection (kaivalya) attained is only figuratively spoken of as what is accomplished 
(sādhya). (Mahadevan 1972: 17). This because the sphere of ignorance, which comprises 
agents and means of action, is, from the transcendental perspective, unreal (ayathā-vastu) and 
that of knowledge the true reality; therefore, the conjunction between the two would be like 
that between the sun and the night (NS 1.56; Alston 1959: p.40).
24
 Consequently, Sureśvara 
dismisses the view that the knowledge of one’s non-duality with the ultimate does not dispel 
ignorance, arguing that knowledge derived from the Vedic revelation demolishes ignorance at 
a single stroke (NS 1.67; p.47).
25
 Third, like his master Śaṁkara, Sureśvara too moves 
between the strict sense of substantival reality, which applies only to the foundational reality 
of the trans-categoreal Self, and the weaker sense that is applicable to the everyday objects of 
social existence. An objector asks whether the teachings of Advaita are intended for the 
empirical self immersed in the dualities of ordinary life or the highest non-dual Self. If it is 
for the latter, since it is always already liberated, the teachings are useless, while if it is for 
the former, since it is irrevocably transmigrant (saṃsāra-svabhāvatvāt), the teaching will not 
lead to liberation. Sureśvara replies that they are directed at individuals who, from their 
empirical standpoints, have not learnt to discriminate between the true self (which is never 
caught in transmigration) and the not-self (NS 4.20; p. 244).
26
 However, while we speak of 
ignorance (avidyā) from our familiar experiences reported as ‘I do not know’, such talk does 
not arise from the standpoint of the Self which is the eternal substantival reality (ātma-vastu) 
(NS 3.111; p. 224). 
27
 Sureśvara therefore argues that while action is not a direct means of 
liberation, action contributes to the destruction of ignorance through a series of effects. 
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Sureśvara outlines this series (paramparā) as beginning with the performance of daily rituals 
which leads to dharma, which leads sequentially to destruction of sin (papa), purity of mind, 
correct understanding of transmigratory existence, indifference to the world, desire for 
liberation, search for means to liberation, renunciation of ritual action, practice of yoga 
(yogābhyāsa), focussing of the mind within (cittasya pratyak-pravaṇatā), knowledge of texts 
such as ‘thou art that’, eradication of ignorance, and finally establishment in the Self alone 
(NS 1.51–52; p. 37).28 Therefore, seekers of liberation (mumukṣu) should perform daily and 
occasional rituals (nityaṁ naimittikam) for the purification of the mind, for by performing 
these rituals, indifference to worldly enjoyments is generated, and the dirt of passion and 
delusion is rubbed away from the mind till it becomes clear like a well-polished crystal 
(sammārjita-sphaṭika-śilā-kalpam) or a mirror that abides in (avatiṣṭhate) the inner Self (NS 
1.47; pp. 34–35).29 Indeed, Sureśvara is emphatic that individuals who have not developed 
indifference to worldly affairs, and not practised certain ethical disciplines, should not be 
introduced to Advaita (NS 4.70; p. 266).
30
 However, while such actions dispose an individual 
for the attainment of liberation through the hearing of scriptural texts, they do not, strictly 
speaking, cause liberation which is the self-established Brahman. Therefore, Sureśvara 
opposes the view, associated with Maṇḍana (a rough contemporary of Śaṁkara), that the 
knowledge gained from scripture is only indirect, and repeated meditation can turn this 
indirect knowledge into the direct knowledge which puts an end to notions of duality 
(Comans 2000: 383–85). 
 
A common theme that has emerged from our discussion of Śaṁkara and Sureśvara is that 
while, strictly speaking, all individuals are always already the eternal Brahman in the 
transcendental core of their empirical beings, they have to ‘progress’ towards this 
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transcendental vantage-point. However, it would seem paradoxical to state that the indivisible 
Brahman, the substantival hyper-Ground of all empirical reality, is changeless and not the 
transient end-product of a chain of effects, on the one hand, and that human beings, who are 
essentially Brahman, have to move towards the eternal Brahman, on the other hand. The 
Advaita tradition employs the vocabulary of two ‘levels’ of truth as an intended resolution of 
this paradox: it is only, as it were, from below that we seek to attain the intuitive realization 
of non-duality with Brahman, for we are always essentially Brahman, as it were, from above. 
Thus, the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā, for all its affirmations, from above, of the transcendental 
unreality of (empirical) difference states, from below, that the Upaniṣads compassionately 
(anukampayā) prescribe to people, who are at different stages of understanding, meditations 
which involve notions of duality as devices through which they may gradually grasp the truth 
(GK 3.15–16; p.23).Karmarkar 1953: 23).31  
 
The Indivisibility of Substantival Reality  
 
The reason why we may not speak, in Advaitic contexts, of substantivally real individuals 
progressing towards Brahman is because Reality is utterly undifferentiated, which is a 
conclusion that Advaitic texts seek to establish from its fundamental definition captured in 
Premise 1. Śaṁkara argues that the duality between cause and effect is empirically perceived 
but not metaphysically real, because the effect cannot exist independently of or separately 
from the cause, and whatever is incapable of self-existence is substantivally unreal. A vital 
point of debate between Śaṁkara and the realist Vedāntic schools such as Viśiṣṭādvaita is 
therefore over what criteria should be used for identifying or enumerating substances. As 
Michael Levine argues: ‘Whereas appearances are significant criteria for individuating 
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objects phenomenally understood, they may be irrelevant criteria for the individuation of 
substances’ (Levine 1995: 155). For Śaṁkara, the term ‘substance’ properly applies only to 
that which is absolutely metaphysically independent, so that the distinctions that we propose 
with respect to ordinary objects fail in the case of Brahman, which is the trans-categoreal and 
undifferentiated foundation of the empirical world. While Śaṁkara argues that particulars 
such as gold bracelets do not have any independent existence over and above their material 
cause, and hence are unreal, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin denies the ‘fundamental premise that only that 
which has an independent existence can be truly real’ (Comans 1989: 195). The analytic 
definitions structuring the Advaitin’s argument can therefore be spelled out in the following 
manner: 
 
Reality = Df that which is causally independent.  
Premise 4: If x is causally dependent, then x is not Reality. 
Premise 5: The empirical world is causally dependent on its substantival hyper-Ground of 
Brahman (from Upaniṣadic exegesis). 
Conclusion: The empirical world is not Reality.  
 
Śaṁkara uses this argument against the Vaiśeṣika system which accepts six metaphysically 
independent categories which are absolutely different (atyanta-bhinnān) from one another. 
Regarding the crucial point of the relation between substance and attribute, the Vaiśeṣika 
argues, on the one hand, that they are substantivally different, and, on the other, that they are 
connected through the relation of inherence (samavāya). Śaṁkara argues that the postulation 
of samavāya to connect the relata will lead to the following dilemma. On the one hand, one 
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would need to postulate another higher-order samavāya to connect each of the relata and the 
original samavāya, which would start an infinite regress. On the other hand, if the samavāya 
is not connected in any manner to the relata, this would result in the dissolution of the bond 
between the relata (BSB II, 1, 18;  Thibaut 1890: vol.1, p. 335).
32
 Śaṁkara seeks to resolve 
this dilemma by denying the metaphysical reality of samavāya: he argues that while we do 
perceive fire and smoke to be distinct (bheda), substances and ‘their’ putative qualities are 
not perceived in this manner. Rather, when we perceive a blue lotus the substance is cognized 
by means of the quality, and the quality therefore has its basis in the substance (tasmād 
dravyātmakatā guṇasya) (BSB II, 2, 17; vol.1, p. 395).33 Śaṁkara’s argument about the 
logical incoherence of the category of samavāya seeks to establish the point that the ‘relation’ 
between the world and Brahman, its self-established foundational ground, is that of identity 
(tādātmya) (BSB II, 2, 38; vol.1, p. 436).34 Consequently, all changes are to be located at the 
level of empirical perception structured by ignorance (avidyā), but from the substantivally 
Real standpoint of undifferentiated Brahman these are insubstantial illusions (māyā). 
 
We arrive at the thesis which helps Advaita to explain how undifferentiated Brahman appears 
to be divided into empirical objects – namely, that this process resists any logical explication 
in terms of realist categories. As Sureśvara notes, the ignorance which seems to produce 
duality is without a cause, violates all rules and reasons (sarva-nyāya-virodhini), and does not 
brook investigation (sahate na vicāram) any more than darkness brooks the light of the sun 
(NS 3.66;  Alston 1959: p. 194).
35
 A modern commentator on Advaita, T.P. Ramachandran 
(1969: 3) echoes Sureśvara in arguing that regarding questions about the nature of avidyā, 
Advaitins claim that since discursive thinking itself is a part of avidyā, such reasoning will 
not be able to answer such questions. Since the temporal process is associated with avidyā, 
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we cannot enquire about the beginning of avidyā, but neither can we state that avidyā is 
beginningless in the same unqualified sense that Brahman is for avidyā would then be 
interminable. Therefore, the postulation of māyā as an explanatory principle is to be taken as 
the admission that the nature of the empirical world is inscrutable, for it is, metaphysically 
speaking, neither substantivally real nor utterly unreal (anirvacanīya) (Mahadevan 1977: 
248). Indeed, R. Puligandla claims that the very attempt to explain the how rests on the 
category mistake of assuming that Brahman is an object alongside finite objects which are 
measurable, thinkable, or objectifiable. Since Brahman is not a part of this empirical 
categoreal framework, all attempts to explicate the nature of māyā ‘only result in dogmatic 
metaphysical systems and theologies, which cannot bear thorough rational scrutiny, the tool 
of māyā … Śaṅkara was right to reject every effort to rationally explain māyā …’ (Puligandla 
2013: 622). Therefore, the Advaitic thesis of the undifferentiated Brahman as the 
foundational Reality and the principle of māyā together form a tight logical circle, which 
allows classical Advaita to argue against their doctrinal rivals that their criticisms are 
themselves a product of ignorance. Thuss Vedānta Deśika presents, in his Śatadūṣanī (vol.3, 
p.25), a dilemma against the Advaitic understanding of liberation in this manner. Regarding 
the cessation of ignorance (avidyānivṛtti), he enquires whether this termination itself is 
illusory or real. If it is real, he asks whether it constitutes the very nature of Brahman. If yes, 
then avidyā would always be sublated; however, if it is said that Brahman arises after the 
cessation of avidyā, Brahman would be non-eternal. (Dvivedi 1984: vol.3, 25). Deśika 
presents an Advaitin opponent who argues that such criticisms levelled against the doctrine of 
avidyā do not hold because avidyā itself is ultimately unreal. Therefore, theThis is because 
the very  fact that avidyā cannot be grasped through any of the means of knowledge is not a 
blemish but is in fact an ornament (bhūṣaṇam, na tu dūṣaṇam) for Advaita (vol.3, 338). 
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The vital question, of course, is how liberation is to be possible, if the very means aimed at 
liberation are themselves a part of ignorance. Once again, Advaitic texts seek to resolve this 
paradox through the dynamic of the ‘level-shift’ indicated in previous sections. Sureśvara 
outlines this shift tersely when he argues that by dissolving itself, the I-notion, which realises 
its non-duality with Brahman, serves as an instrument in the realization of the truth (NS 3.43; 
p.173). Alston 1959: 173).
36
 Further, he notes in his Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika (pp. 
380–81) that the The cognition ‘I am Brahman’ is such that it can destroy ignorance and can 
itself disappear, in the same way that medicine disappears after destroying a disease. 
(Balasubramanian 1974: 380–81). Therefore, in addition to the partite knowledge 
(khaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna) which removes ignorance about empirical objects, the Advaita 
traditions speak of the impartite knowledge (akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna) which can remove 
ignorance about the formless Brahman, while itself perishing in the process of producing a 
direct knowledge of Brahman (Grimes 1991b: 298). That is, the human intellect, which is a 
product of avidyā, can, when it undergoes a scripturally-guided spiritual discipline, become 
the instrument which removes this ignorance as well as itself. (Indich 1980: 56). As R. 
Balasubramanian puts it, scriptural texts such as ‘I am Brahman’ produce ‘the non-sentential 
sense which goes beyond the realm of mind and speech. How it does is a mystery. But the 
truth is that it does’ (Balasubramanian 2000: 229). 
 
The Reality of Dependent Substance 
 
The Advaitin appeals to ‘mystery’ can be read as an argumentative strategy to grapple with 
the notion that the empirical world is a ‘dependent substance’, which implies that it is real to 
the extent that it is grounded in Brahman, and substantivally unreal to the extent that it is not 
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self-established. Indeed, it is because the world is not a substantival reality that it can be 
sublated, for given the strict definition of ‘substance’ in Gauḍapāda, Śaṁkara, and Sureśvara 
(Premise 1), it would be a logical contradiction to claim that the substantivally real world has 
been negated. The Advaita position on the ‘reality’ of the world has therefore been aptly 
characterised by C. Ram-Prasad as a form of ‘non-realism’ which states that there is no non-
cognitive means of establishing whether the world is metaphysically determinate or not 
(Ram-Prasad 2002: 121). Śrī Harṣa (c. 1200 CE) elaborates this ‘non-realism’ against the 
Nyāya school which speaks of causally efficient objects that are independent of cognition, to 
claim that all that is required to explain (empirically observed) causal regularities is the 
cognition of these regularities. If he were to venture to describe the natures of things 
independently of cognition, he would be transgressing his own restrictions about not 
providing assertions about the world beyond the features attributed to it from within the circle 
of cognitive access. Ram-Prasad points out that Śrī Harṣa’s conclusions make his ontology 
contingent on our current human features of cognition, and that this is precisely the result that 
the Advaitin needs to indicate the provisionality of the empirical world (Ram-Prasad 2002: 
188–197).  
 
A key question that has therefore shaped Advaitin dialectics down the medieval centuries is 
the degree of reality that can be attributed to the empirical world. We may characterise the 
post-Śaṁkara Advaita traditions as Strong Advaita (SA) or Weak Advaita (WA) depending 
on the varying degrees of reality they ascribe to the empirical world. This distinction is, of 
course, only conceptual, for both SA and WA share the basic thesis that underlying 
phenomenal appearances stands the unitary foundation of Brahman. However, while SA 
tends to claim that phenomenal entities do not have any measure of empirical reality, WA is 
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willing to speak of grades of reality: the transcendental (pāramārthika), the conventional 
(vyāvahārikī), and the illusory (prātibhāsikī) (Upadhyaya 1959: 26–29).   
 
Śaṁkara himself occupies a position nearer to WA on this conceptual spectrum. He notes that 
if Brahman-realization could annihilate the world in the same way that butter can be melted 
by bringing it near fire, the first released person would have performed this feat. In fact, until 
such knowledge of Brahman as the foundational ground of the phenomenal world has been 
generated, we will not be able to dissolve it even if we were commanded a hundred times 
(BSB III, 2, 21; Thibaut 1890: vol.2, p. 163).
37
 Further, the conditions of time and space 
location, causality, and non-refutation (abādha) help us, according to Śaṁkara, to distinguish 
phenomenally (not metaphysically) between dreams and waking experience (BSB III, 2, 3; 
vol.2, pp.134–36).38 Therefore, Śaṁkara rejects the Vijñānavāda Buddhist claim that an 
account of everyday experience can reject references to external objects, viewing these 
merely as mental projections which are intrinsic to cognitive episodes. Śaṁkara argues that 
experience can be adequately explained only with the notion of the externality of phenomenal 
objects, for the distinction of the embodied selves and their objects of experience is well 
known from ordinary existence (BSB II, 1, 13; vol.1, p.319).
39
 Śaṁkara’s position is 
therefore realist from an idealist perspective because it asserts that an adequate explication of 
our cognitive experience requires the assumption (and not the substantival reality) of 
cognition-independent objects, but is idealist from a realist point of view because it holds that 
there is no proof that a world of such cognition-independent objects exists. In C. Ram-
Prasad’s words, just as Śaṁkara is ‘[a]n anti-idealist about the denial of externality, he is 
equally an anti-realist about its assertion’ (Ram-Prasad 2002: 61). Śaṁkara therefore offers 
no clear answers on topics such as whether there is only one self or many selves, does not 
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speculate about whether the logical status of the world can be classified as real or unreal or 
neither, and does not develop a causal theory of the relation between Brahman and the world 
in terms of an apparent transformation (vivarta) (Potter 1991: 165). He answers the question 
‘whose is avidyā?’ by saying that it belongs to the very individual who is raising it, and this 
somewhat cryptic response has often been read by modern commentators as an indication that 
Śaṁkara was more concerned with pedagogic techniques aimed at liberation than with logical 
scrutiny of the nature of ignorance (Doherty 2005: 210).  
 
The immediate post-Śaṁkara traditions, however, grappled precisely with these questions 
related to the substantival reality of ignorance (Grant 1999: 188–89), and they can be 
arranged on a finely-graded continuum depending on their conceptual proximity to SA or 
WA. The three theories often noted in the secondary literature on Advaita regarding the 
relation between the finite self (jīva) and Brahman can also be located on this conceptual 
spectrum. According to the ābhāsa-vāda of Sureśvara, the finite self is an insubstantial 
appearance of Brahman, and because of its association with the intellect, itself a product of 
ignorance, it seemingly undergoes empirical experiences. According to Padmapāda (c. 900 
CE) and his commentator Prakāśātman (c. 1300 CE), the Lord is the reflection of Brahman 
into ignorance (ajñāna) and the finite self the reflection of Brahman into the mind, itself a 
product of ignorance. Both these theories accept Brahman as the common locus of ignorance 
(brahmāśrita) and ‘telescope’ the diversities of the insubstantial empirical world into 
Brahman (Nachane 2000: 98). However, we can already detect a subtle move towards 
‘substantializing’ ignorance in Padmapāda who reads the compound mithyajñāna in Śaṁkara 
as mithyā-ajñāna, as an indefinable force of avidyā (avidyā-śakti) which is the material cause 
(nimitta) out of which the world is produced (Solomon 1969: 257). Sarvajñātman (c. 1000 
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CE), a disciple of Sureśvara, too argues, on the one hand, that ignorance (ajñāna) is 
‘something’ more positive than an absolute negation (abhāva) (thus nodding in the direction 
of WA), because it is the transformatory cause of the universe in its different phases, and, on 
the other hand, that it is almost essenceless (nirvastuka) when compared with the 
transcendental reality (thus moving back towards SA) (Saṁkṣepa-Śārīrakam 2, 125; 
Divyananda Giri 1999: vol.2, p. 984).
40
 The insentient ajñāna, which depends entirely on 
Brahman, is the instrument (dvāra) through which the world appears (Saṁkṣepa-Śārīrakam 
1, 323; vol.1, p. 484).
41
 However, in contrast to the ‘reflectionism’ indicated in the above 
theories, Vācaspati (c. 900 CE) takes the phenomenally real finite self to be the locus of 
ignorance (jivāśrita), so that the world is projected by the ignorance of each individual self. 
On the ‘limitation’ metaphor, the unitary Self appears to have become divided into parts 
because of the limiting adjuncts of the finite selves through which it is viewed, so that this 
metaphor accords a greater degree of empirical reality to phenomenalthe empirical objects. 
Vācaspati therefore argues against the view that there is only one self (ekajīvavāda) on the 
grounds that it implies that the liberation of the primordial self would lead to the liberation of 
all (Nachane 2000: 99). However, while Vācaspati’s theory grants in this manner the power 
to produce the phenomenal world to the finite selves and thus stands near to WA, it has to 
deal with the spectre of metaphysical solipsism. If there is a plurality of selves, each with its 
own avidyā, there would seemingly be a plurality of worlds, while empirical usage demands a 
common world for all selves.  
 
Prakāśānanda (c. 1600 CE) consistently accepts these implications of Vācaspati’s WA: 
denying even the phenomenal reality of the external world and of the Lord, he affirms that 
ignorance is one, and that there is only one self. He develops his argument through his 
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responses to a series of objections from fellow-Advaitins who have a relatively more ‘realist’ 
standpoint regarding the external world. First, to the objection that on the liberation of one 
individual, everybody would be liberated, he replies in his Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī 
(p.20) that that this thesis, about the liberation of all selves if one self is liberated 
(sarvamuktiprasaṅga), is question-begging against the proponent of the one-self doctrine, 
since the existence of multiple selves first needs to be established. (Venis 1890: 20). Second, 
to the objection that the teachers of Vedānta spoke of a three-fold classification of existence 
because they taught that empirical duality exists even though unperceived (ajñātasyāpi 
dvaitasya sattvamabhyupagacchanti), Prakāśānanda replies that there is in fact only a two-
fold classification of absolute reality (pāramārthikī) and of merely phenomenal (that is, 
mind-dependent) reality (prātītikī), and the ancients spoke of a third conventional 
(vyāvahārika) reality only as a concession to the ignorant. That is, existence is 
contemporaneous with perception, so that to be is to be perceived (pratītimātraṁ sattvaṁ) (p. 
40). Prakāśānada rejects, in effect, the view that the senses operate on objects already existing 
(sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭi-vāda); according to him, the world is produced anew at the operation of the 
senses, and the externality of the world to sense perceptions cannot be demonstrated 
(Solomon 1969: 291). Third, the objector asks why, after waking, individuals are able to 
recognise their surroundings as identical to those in which they had fallen asleep. 
Prakāśāasananda replies that similarities in experiences across individuals are due to 
consiliences in shared illusions, in the same way that ten men can run away from one illusory 
snake, which is perceived individually by all of them. Drawing the ‘idealist’ implications of 
his position, Prakāśānanda argues that while there really are no teachers, knowledge can 
arises even through an imagined teacher (kalpitena guruṇā vidyotpattisaṁbhavāt) (Venis 
1890: (p.142). In fact, Prakāśānanda explicitly rejects the category of ‘causality’ with respect 
to either Brahman or ignorance. He argues that it is mistaken to view Brahman as the cause of 
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the universe; Brahman is metaphorically called the cause only because Brahman is the 
substratum of ignorance. Nor is ignorance the cause of the world; if ignorance is said to be 
the cause, this is only to avoid the silence (apratibhā) that ensues when asked ‘what is the 
cause of the world?’ (p. 118). 
 
The Unreality of the World 
 
Prakāśānanda thus arrives at a position similar to SA: the world-appearance has no reality 
whatsoever, all talk of causation or production is substantivally ungrounded, and Brahman is 
the sole reality. To return to our question, ‘how real is the world?’ we can therefore see that 
in the WA of figures such as Prakāśātman, the world structured by ignorance (ajñāna) holds 
an ontologically precarious ‘midway’ position, which Prakāśānanda’s thorough-going 
SAidealism reduces to phenomenal unreality (dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda). Since the phenomenal 
diversity of the empirical world cannot be explained in terms of the unchanging Brahman, the 
strategy adopted by post-Śaṁkara Advaitins other than Prakāśānanda was to postulate a 
mysterious indefinable ‘stuff’ of ajñāna (Dasgupta 1922: 479) to grapple with the following 
dilemma. If ajñāna were totally unreal, we could not appeal to it to explain our phenomenal 
experiences of diversity, while if it were substantivally real, we would not be able to sublate 
it on our path towards enlightenment. The Advaita traditions therefore often speak of a two-
fold power (śakti) of ignorance to conceal the nature of reality (āvaraṇa-śakti) and also to 
project erroneous cognitions (vikṣepa-śakti). The relation between these two powers is causal: 
the concealment (kāraṇāvidyā) is the cause of the projected effects (kāryāvidyā), and hence 
the concealing factor is referred to by some post-Śaṁkara commentators as the ‘root 
ignorance’ (mulāvidyā) (Doherty 2005: 213–14). Therefore, the negative prefix in a-jñāna or 
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a-vidyā is to be understood in the sense of opposition, so that avidyā is not merely 
psychological ignorance but some kind of existence (kiñcid-bhāvarūpa) which is opposed to 
knowledge, and can be removed by knowledge which is its opposite (ajñāna-virodhi) 
(Doherty 2005: 214). In other words, ajñāna is not utterly non-existent, it is a mysterious 
third ‘something’ that shares partly in the characteristics of existence (to the extent that it is 
the cause of the illusory transformations of the world) and of non-existence (to the extent that 
it is substantivally unreal). That Advaitins who seek to avoid Prakāśānanda’s position are 
hard-pressed to accord some measure of reality to the empirical world is seen in Citsukha’s 
claim that ignorance is different from the concept of positivity as well as of negativity, and is 
called positive only because of the fact that it is not negative (bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇasya 
ajñānasya abhāva-vilakṣaṇatva-mātreṇa bhāvatvopacārāt) (Dasgupta 1932: 153). 
 
The Varieties of ‘Substance’ in Vedānta 
 
These disputes in classical and medieval Advaita, centred around the ‘substantiality’ of 
ignorance, have been revived through the writings of Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati 
(1880–1975) who arguesd that the understanding of avidyā as ‘substance-like’ is a 
fundamental misreading of Śaṁkara. (Swami Satchidanandendra 1996: 13–15). He argues, 
somewhat provocatively, that the true lineage of Advaita runs through Gauḍapāda and 
Śaṁkara, and that post-Śaṁkara Advaitins other than Sureśvara haved misunderstood the 
nature of ignorance.  The opponents of Swami Satchidanandendra defend the WA position 
that while ignorance is an existent (bhāvarupa) ignorance is not real (avāstava); therefore, 
knowledge of Brahman is able to sublate ignorance (Doherty 2005: 223). However, he 
understands ignorance purely in the sense of lack of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva), so that his 
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position resembles Prakāśānanda’s denial of even the phenomenal reality of the empirical 
world (that is, SA). Thus, he concludes that since avidyā is nothing other than 
superimposition (adhyāsa), in the state of deep sleep, where there is no possibility of such 
misconception, the distinction between the self and Brahman (jīva-brahma-vibhāga) does not 
exist (Swami Satchidanandendra 1996:pp. 94–95). Consequently, the conceptual positions in 
classical Advaita that we have labelled SA and WA are re-articulated in the debates between 
Swami Satchidanandendra and his critics. He argues that ignorance is utterly insubstantial, 
for if avidyā were to exist through the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, then, 
given Śaṁkara’s definition of the Real as that whose nature is undeviating, it would become 
as substantivally real as the Self (p. 111). However, he still has to explain how the empirical 
world re-appears when an individual wakes up from deep sleep, to which he replies with the 
classical Advaita strategy of shifting across standpoints: phenomenal individuals mistakenly 
imagine themselves to be bound while they are, transcendentally speaking, eternally free. 
Comans presents the opposing Advaita view, which he attributes also to Sureśvara, that the 
reason why deep sleep is not equivalent to liberation is because ignorance persists in that 
state, even though the mind, conditioned by its karma, remains in a latent condition. Through 
the influence of this karma the mind becomes manifest on waking so that the finite self 
returns to the workaday world (Comans 1990: 3–4).  
 
We return through a different route to the key question ‘precisely how real is the world?’ that 
continues to structure intra-Advaitic disputes over the ‘substantiality’ of ignorance. Both 
Swami Satchidanandendra and his critics agree that from the transcendental standpoint 
(pāramārthika) the phenomenal world is substantivally an illusion; however, the central point 
of dispute between SA and WA is over what measure, as it were, of reality it enjoys from the 
empirical (vyāvahārika) standpoint (Doherty 2005: 227). Disputes over the ‘substantiality’ of 
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the world are, of course, not restricted to intra-Advaitic circles; indeed, many of the 
arguments that we have outlined were formulated in response to critiques levelled at Advaita 
from rival Vedāntic systems such as Viśiṣṭādvaita. We may extract from the enormous 
literature of intra-Vedāntic disputes over the notion of ‘substance’ five arguments of Vedānta 
Deśika against the Advaitic view that the empirical world is an insubstantial illusion.  
 
Firstly, theologians such as Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika reject the basic Advaitic definition 
of Reality in terms of metaphysical independence, to argue for the plausibility of the concept 
of a metaphysically real but dependent substance, namely, empirical objects. Rejecting the 
Advaitic definitional equivalence between true reality and permanence, they claim that the 
mere fact that something exists only for a limited duration does not render it unreal. Thus 
Deśika argues in Śatadūṣanī that we should distinguish between destruction (vināśa), which 
means that an object which exists at one time is non-existent at another, and sublation 
(bādha), which means that an (illusory) object does not exist even when it is perceived. More 
schematically, while the Advaitin holds, given the Advaita equivalence, that if ‘reality’ is 
ascribed to an entity x, then the statement ‘x did not exist five seconds ago and x exists now’ 
is a logical contradiction, whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaitin views, on the basis of the argument that 
it is ‘perfectly possible that something exist but only exist for a time’ (Yandell 2001: 173), 
such statements to be contingently true or false. Therefore, while an (impermanent) effect is 
subject first to origination and subsequently to dissolution, Deśika argues that this does not 
imply that it does not exist during its own time, and hence it cannot be regarded as 
metaphysically unreal (Dvivedi 1984: (vol.4, p.197). More specifically, against the Advaita 
doctrine that causal substances are ‘more’ real than their effects, Deśika argues that effects in 
the sense of effect-states (kāryāvasthā) such as pots do not exist in the cause, but are 
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produced by special powers at specific spatio-temporal locations (vol.4, p.191). Secondly, 
texts in the tradition of Advaita dialectics seek to demonstrate that there cannot be real (as 
opposed to merely conceptual) relations between two substantivally real entities, on the 
grounds that such relations would lead to an infinite regress that we noted in our discussion of 
the notion of inherence (samavāya). Deśika argues, in response, that it is a mistake to think 
that if we speak of a relation between two objects, the relation itself must be related to the 
relata, for a relation is able to relate the terms without depending on any other relations 
(vol.2, p.155). The basic argument is here is that while a relation helps to constitute a unity of 
non-relational entities, the relation itself and its relata do not form a unity which would 
require the postulation of a higher-order relation (Dravid 2000: 155–56). The Advaitin would, 
of course, claim that in a universe populated with (enduring) substances, (transient) qualities, 
and (contingent) relations, there is one thing too many; however, this takes us back to 
Advaita’s definitional equivalence between ‘truly existent’ and ‘immutability’ (Premise 1), 
which Deśika does not accept. 
 
Thirdly, Advaita dialectics seeks to demonstrate that the very category of ‘difference’ is 
logically incoherent, so as to arrive at the conclusion of the indivisibility of substantival 
Reality. Deśika’s response reflects the Viśiṣṭādvaita view that there are real ‘differences’ 
between substances and attributes, causes and effects, and so on: we are able, in perceptual 
experience, to apprehend the generic character (jāti) of an object, and this character itself 
marks the distinction of that object from other objects. While perception lasts for a moment, 
it is able to grasp even in that moment both the object (vastu) and its distinctive 
characteristics that distinguish it from other objects (vol.2, p.22). Therefore, against the 
Advaitic thesis that the phenomenal world is (transcendentally) unreal because it is distinct 
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from Brahman, Deśika argues that a real entity does not become unreal merely because it is 
different from another real entity (satyāntaravyatirekamātreṇāsatyaprasaṅgābhāvāt) (vol.2, 
p. 83). More categoreally, he states that it is the nature of things (tattvavyavasthā) that all 
entities are not-different (abhinna) from themselves and different (bhinna) from other entities 
(vol.2, p. 41). Fourthly, Deśika focuses on the ‘level-shift’ between the conventional and the 
transcendental that Advaitic texts employ to argue that ‘difference’ is only conventionally 
real, and states that there is, in fact, more than one way to characterise the conventional. He 
argues that Advaitins cannot reject Buddhist texts as non-authoritative on the grounds that 
they are based on defective sources (doṣamūlatva), since they admit that their Vedas, which 
are transcendentally unreal, too are defective. If the Advaitins were to claim that the 
authoritativeness of the Vedas is only conventional, the crux of the matter is the nature of the 
conventional (kiṁ tat vyāvahārikatvam), because this appeal to conventionality is available 
also to the Mādhyamikas who reject the Vedāntic view that the world has a transcendental 
foundation (vol.2, p.374). Fifthly, a key argumentative point in Deśika’s text relates to the 
significance of everyday ‘conventional’ experience in formulating one’s metaphysics. For 
instance, after defending the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika understanding of ‘substance’ against Advaitic 
criticisms, S. Bhaduri (1975: 7) argues that the school does not accept the Advaitic notion of 
one universal formless existence because of its ‘loyalty to experience which bears 
unmistakable testimony to plurality and diversity’. Deśika articulates a similar point when he 
argues that if the Advaitin seeks a clarification of the type of relation (saṁbandha) between 
consciousness and object, it may be designated as the subject-object relation which is 
reflected in everyday usage. For just as the distinction between sugarcane juice and milk is 
clearly evident to us, even if we are unable to spell out this distinction in clear terms, the 
distinction between subject and object is equally evident to us, and cannot be denied (vol.2, 
p.152). As we have noted, while Advaitins too (with the major exception of Prakāśānanda) do 
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not reject the concept of ‘externality’ in everyday epistemic dealings, they would argue, once 
again following their definitional equivalences between substantiality, immutability, and 
indivisibility (Premises 1 and 4), that empirical subjects and objects are not substantivally 
real.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Our discussion has highlighted the significance in Advaitic thought of the thesis that, as the 
medieval Advaitin Sadānanda puts it in histext Vedāntasāra (pp.9–10), puts it, Brahman 
alone is the permanent ‘substantial’ Reality (vastu) and all phenomenal things are transient. 
(Swami Nikhilananda 1949: 9–10). Further, this specific Advaita understanding of 
‘substance’ (defined analytically, through Upaniṣadic exegesis, as immutable and indivisible) 
and the doctrine of the two standpoints of truth form an integral conceptual whole, allowing 
the different strands of Advaita, depending on their proximity to SA or WA, to claim that 
everyday cognitive and social practices have empirical validity but are substantivally unreal. 
Thus, in response to an Advaitin who wants to know how one can demonstrate the existence 
of the finite self in deep sleep, Deśika replies that it is seen that what exists earlier in time and 
later in time also exists in between (purvottaravatyahamarthapratisandhānabalādeva 
madhye’ pi tatkalpanāt) (Dvivedi 1984: (vol.2, p.294). The Advaitin, following Gauḍapāda’s 
aphorism noted above, might claim that while Deśika’s principle is empirically valid, what 
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does not exist at the beginning and at the end does not exist, transcendentally speaking, even 
in the present (ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne’ pi tat tathā). Thus, taking up opposing 
positions in the great Vedāntic debate over ‘what there is’, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin argues that the 
reflection ‘I did not know anything during sleep’ show that the (metaphysically real) knowing 
subject is not apprehended as ‘I’ by the attributive consciousness (dharmabhūtajñāna) 
because the latter did not have any objects during that state. While the Advaitin argues that 
the empirical ‘I’ cannot be the true Self of the individual because it is not invariable, the 
Viśiṣṭādvaitin replies that the ‘I’ is indeed the real empirical self because it persists at all 
times, even though the fluctuating attributive consciousness is temporarily contracted during 
sleep (Comans 1990).  
 
 
Consequently, some of the central disputes between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita can be traced 
to a basic divergence in their conceptualisations of ‘substance’, which informs their responses 
to questions such as whether the postulation of a plurality of metaphysically real substances 
can be logically defended, whether the concept of a ‘dependent substance’ is coherent, 
whether real relations between the ultimate substance and dependent substances can be 
explicated without inconsistency, and so on. Thus, while Advaitins such as Śaṁkara and 
Sureśvara characterise substantial reality as that which is immutable (and this definitional 
equivalence is woven into their scriptural exegesis), Viśiṣṭādvaitins such as Vedānta Deśika, 
who view ‘substantiality’ in terms of persistence despite change, articulate a theological 
landscape structured by the supreme Person Viṣṇu–Nārāyaṇa and finite ontological 
dependent substances. These debates over ‘substantiality’ are not restricted to Vedāntic 
discourse, and they sometimes crucially shape the nature of philosophical argumentation on 
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somewhat different contextual horizons. Thus, defining ‘substance’ in terms of causal 
independence, Descartes concludes that, strictly speaking, there is only one substance, 
namely, God because only God is completely causally independent and for God depends on 
no other thing.g. However, Descartes (1985: vol.1, 114) simultaneously affirms that God’s 
creatures should be regarded as ‘created substances’ which need divine sustenance for their 
existence. The Cartesian conceptual tension between, on the one hand, attributing 
‘substantiality’, strictly speaking, to God alone, and, on the other hand, affirming ontological 
distinctions between ‘created substances’  also frames the texts of two medieval Dominicans, 
Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart. While for Thomas creatures possess a being (esse) that 
is really their own, Eckhart restricts the proper sense of being only to God so that for Eckhart 
creaturely reality lacks any intrinsic being. H. Nicholson therefore sums up the difference 
between these theologians in these terms: ‘while for Thomas created beings are a quasi nihil, 
for Eckhart they are a pure nihil’ (Nicholson 2011: 164). 
 
We can visualize these debates over being (esse) in medieval Christian mysticism and over 
substance (substantia)  in modern European philosophy as centred on some of the key 
themesconcepts that we have discussed with respect to Vedāntic philosophical theology.  As 
we have seen, while Vedāntic thinkers in general argue against the (Vijñāna) Buddhist denial 
of ‘substantiality’ to the empirical world, Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins disagree in turn over 
precisely what kind of ‘substantiality’ should be attributed to the world. While Viśiṣṭādvaitins 
such as Rāmānuja develop an ontological scheme in which the phenomenal world is 
substantivally real (and ‘grounded’ in the Lord Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa), Advaitins themselves 
occupy different positions on a fine-grained conceptual spectrum marked by the two points of 
Weak Advaita (the empirical world as quasi nihil) and Strong Advaita (the empirical world as 
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pure nihil). These are some of the debates that have formed the conceptual structure of the 
rich commentarial traditions of intra-Vedāntic dialectics. 
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